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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002909

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [SP](#)

SUBJECT: SPANISH FM MORATINOS ON SPAIN,S NEW MIDDLE EAST
INITIATIVE, CUBA; CALL FROM NSA CASAJUANA

REF: A. STATE 186533 (NOTAL)

[B](#). STATE 188244

[C](#). MADRID 2893

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Classified By: Hugo Llorens, Deputy Chief of Mission,
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (C/NF) Summary: During a brief but wide-ranging meeting with Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos November 17, Ambassador Aguirre discussed the Middle East initiative proposed by Presidents Zapatero and Chirac at their Nov. 16 meeting in Girona Spain. Ambassdor also took a call from Spanish National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana on the same subject earlier in the day. Both Moratinos and Casajuana insisted they did not seek to undermine the Quartet or US leadership but rather to jump start what they saw as a stalled process. The Ambassador said that while he did not yet have instructions on the Girona proposals, it was clear that Washington would not welcome any initiatives that did not adhere to the consistent demands of the Quartet and the international community and which undermined Quartet leadership. (Later, MFA Political Director Dezcallar phoned DCM to reinforce that Spain did not seek to end-run the US and that its proposals were very much in line with those of the Quartet.) During the meeting with Moratinos, the Ambassador also conveyed ref a points on Iran Air (reported septel) and to express USG concern about the UNGA Special Session on the recent Gaza incidents (ref b). During the meeting, the Ambassador also pressed for Spanish movement on an EU statement on Cuba transition; Moratinos said the MFA was working at "high levels" within the EU on the issue. Finally, the Ambassador took the opportunity to tell Moratinos that the Secretary would not visit Spain this year as indicated in their June 9 meeting in Washington, but would look for an appropriate moment early in 2007. End Summary

//Middle East Proposals

[1](#)2. (C/NF) Moratinos told the Ambassador that he had mentioned to the Secretary during their meeting in June his desire for new initiatives in the Middle East and wrote her a letter with some ideas. Moratinos noted that her response inquired about the EU views but there was no new momentum coming from the US to resolve Middle East issues. Moratinos insisted that Spain looked for US leadership but felt that the process needed to be jump started, hence Zapatero,s initiative with the French and the Alicante Declaration on an international conference.

13. (C/NF) Ambassador Aguirre replied that while he had not seen the full text of the Spain-France proposals and did not yet have formal instructions from Washington, he made clear that Washington was concerned about the lack of cohesion in the EU and that any initiatives that would undermine the Quartet would be negative. The Ambassador referred to our concerns about an international conference, which DCM had conveyed to Deputy Foreign Minister Leon on November 14(ref c). Moratinos insisted that Spain's initiative was not aimed at undermining the Quartet.

14. (C/NF) Moratinos complained that the US was not treating Spain as an important player on Middle East issues, noting, for example, that A/S Welch had not yet responded to the MFA's Western Sahara proposals conveyed in July. He said that if he and the Secretary meet in Amman at the Forum for the Future meeting, he would like to discuss these issues further with her. Moratinos promised to send to the Ambassador an English translation of the Girona proposal.

15. (C/NF) Spanish National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana also phoned the Ambassador about the Zapatero-Chirac initiative, saying that this was in no way a new initiative by Spain but rather a means to re-energize, but not replace, the Quartet. He said that France and Italy were part of the discussion but that the Spain intended to consult with the US all the way. Casajuana seemed somewhat taken aback when the Ambassador noted that Washington might not welcome an effort that could undermine the Quartet and that was not consistent with previous demands on Hamas. Casajuana urged the USG to look for positive elements in the Zapatero proposals.

16. (C/NF) Following these conversations with the Ambassador, MFA Political Director Dezcallar phoned DCM to reinforce that Spain did not seek to end-run the US by these proposals. Dezcallar said he hoped the US would see the proposals as

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very much in line with the core principals laid out by the Quartet, including necessity for Hamas to recognize Israel's right to exist, renunciation of violence, acceptance of the Roadmap and release of the prisoners. Dezcallar emphasized that these were objectives that the Quartet, including the US, supports. DCM responded that since we had not seen the proposal, we were not in a position to comment on it, but referred to the comments the Ambassador had made to Moratinos and the DCM's own meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Leon expressing our negative views on the proposed international conference.

//CUBA/EU Statement//

17. (C/NF) Ambassador Aguirre pressed Moratinos for progress on an EU statement on Cuba democracy transition/human rights. Moratinos said that MFA State Secretary for the EU Alberto Navarro had taken up the issue at the highest levels in the EU. The Ambassador expressed his desire for rapid progress, hopefully before A/S Shannon's possible visit to Madrid in connection with the late November Haiti Donor's conference. Moratinos welcomed Shannon's visit and agreed that bilateral meetings on Latin America on the margins of the conference would be welcome.

//S Visit to Madrid//

18. (C/NF) The Ambassador told Moratinos that the Secretary would not visit Spain this year as she had discussed during her meeting with Moratinos in June, but that her schedulers were looking at the possibility of a visit early in 2007. Ambassador made clear that the North Korea events and the Secretary's trip to the region had derailed a planned trip

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that would have included a stop in Spain. Moratinos replied

that while he and the GOS saw this coming, nonetheless, expressed his frustration at getting the Secretary to visit, saying that the lack of one &undermined his position8 with the Spanish media and policy elites. He expressed disappointment that Spain was being treated as a "second tier power", which it was not, given its role in the EU, the strength of its economy and the extent of its investments. He said he had hoped to travel to Washington and London in January in his role as OSCE Chairman in Office, but that the lack of a visit to Madrid by the Secretary made a Washington stop difficult. The Ambassador reminded Moratinos of the very clear, understandable and transparent events that had forced the postponement of the Madrid visit. Ambassador said he would not provide any ideas on dates of a future possible visit until dates are firm.

//UNGA Special Session//

19. (C/NF) On the UNGA special session (ref B), Moratinos had not been aware of the issue but said he would look at the text of the resolution to see if Spain could work to tone it down. Ambassador pressed for a vote against it, or at least an abstention. (also reported septel).
AGUIRRE